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Summary findings
Developing  countries,  which received  about $35 billion  In other words,  reduced  settlement  rates  spur  telecom
in net settlement  payments  from U.S.  telecom  carriers  traffic  from developing  countries  to the United  States.
between  1985  and 1998,  were upset by the FCC's  And while there is a statistically  significant  correlation
decision  to slash  rates,  because  lower rates mean  lower  between  settlement  payments  and telecom  revenues  in
payments.  They  claim  that the payments  help  finance  developing  countries,  he finds  no correlation  between
telecom  investment,  and that the FCC's decision  will  the payments  and the nunmber  of telephone  mainlines  or
therefore  harm  their telecom  sectors.  imports  of telecommunications  equipment.  In short,
Walisten  uses  a panel  data set for 178  countries  from  there is no evidence  that the payments  are invested  in
1985  to 1998 to test how changes  in settlement  rates  telecom  networks.
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Between  1985  and 1998,  United States  telephone  carriers  transferred  almost  $50 billion
to non-US  carriers  for international  telecommunications  traffic  between  the US and other
countries  (FCC,  2000). Developing  countries  received  about 70 percent of these  payments
(Braga,  et al 1998). The payments  result from large traffic imbalances  between  the US and
almost  every  other country  and international  accounting  rates-bilaterally negotiated  symmetric
prices carriers  pay each other  to terminate  international  telephone  calls in the other  country-that
are far above cost. To deal  with what US carriers  perceived  as unfair subsidies  of foreign
telecom  providers,  in 1997  the U.S. Federal  Communications  Commission  (FCC)  unilaterally
established  benchmark  settlement  rates far below  those in effect at the time. The FCC
established  a stringent  timeline,  with the rates between  the US and even the poorest countries
with the least developed  telephone  networks  scheduled  to fall dramatically  by 2003. Not
surprisingly,  developing  countries  are upset  by the FCC's action, noting  that these payments
represent  a substantial  share  of their total telecom  revenues  and asserting  that the payments  are
necessary  for funding  investment  in their domestic  telecom  networks.
Curiously,  given  the large magnitudes  of the payments  and the importance  of
international  settlement  rates to international  telephone  traffic, there is almost  no empirical  work
on the effects  of settlement  rates. In this paper, I ask two questions. First, how do settlement
rates affect  international  call volume? This question  is important  because  telecom  traffic is a real
economic  good,  while the settlement  payments  are, in a globai  sense,  merely  monetary  transfers.
Second,  do developing  countries,  in fact, use the payments  to fund telecom  investment?  I use a
panel dataset  of 179  countries  from 1985  to 1998  to explore  the effects  of settlement  rates on
international  telecom  traffic and on investment  in domestic  telecom  networks.
Page 2I find a strong,  statistically  significant  negative  relationship  between international
settlement  rates and calls from other countries  to the US, even controlling  for country  and year
fixed  effects,  population,  per capita  income,  and country's income  classification  (low, lower-
middle,  upper-middle,  and high income). The relationship  appears  to be strongest  in the poorest
countries,  where I find an elasticity  of about  negative  0.9-each  one percent decrease  in
settlement  rates  leads to a 0.9 percent increase  in outbound  traffic  to the United  States. In other
words,  reducing  settlement  rates stimulates  international  telecom  traffic, which,  presumably,
improves  economic  growth.
Lower settlement  rates also reduce  settlement  payments  from the US. How will reduced
payments  affect  developing  countries? Consistent  with the claims,  I find a statistically
significant  positive  relationship  between  settlement  payments  and telecom revenues  in poor
countries. However,  the results suggest  that the settlement  payments  are not invested  in the local
network. I find no correlation  between  settlement  payments  and telephone  mainlines  or imports
of telecommunications  equipment.
International  Accounting  Rates
"Accounting  rates" for International  Message  Telephone  Service  (IMTS)  are bilaterally
negotiated  rates for international  telephone  calls between  every pair of countries  in the world. In
theory,  the accounting  rate represents  the cost of an international  telephone  call between  a
country-pair  (Frieden, 1996). The originating  and terminating  carriers  are assumed  to have equal
costs  in completing  the call. The "settlement  rate"-the  amount  the originating  carrier  pays the
foreign  carrier  to complete  the call-is  typically  half the accounting  rate. The originating  carrier
Page 3bills the caller some  retail  price (the "collection  rate"), pays  the foreign  carrier  the settlement
rate, and keeps  the balance.I
While  accounting  rates are supposed  to reflect  the cost of a telephone  call between  two
countries,  almost  nobody  even pretends  to maintain  that  fiction anymore. The FCC (1997)
estimated  that accounting  rates  were five to ten times the true cost of completing  a call. By some
estimates,  the total cost (including  operating  expenses)  of an international  call over cable  and
satellite  services  was less  than $0.01 per minute by 1996  (FCC, 1997). That year the average
settlement  rate  for calls between  the US and other  countries  excluding  Western  Europe  and
North America  was about $0.88 per minute. Even countries  that receive  large net settlement
payments  from US carriers  do not claim  that  the accounting  rates reflect  the true costs of IMTS
service. Instead,  they say that the payments  are an important  component  of their telecom
revenue  and are necessary  for financing  investments  in the local network  (e.g.,  Khalidson,  2000;
Braga, 1999;  Telecommunications  Reports, 1997).
If international  telecom  traffic  were relatively  balanced,  telecom carriers  would  have little
reason  to complain,  as net settlement  payments  would  be mininal. 2 But there is no reason  to
believe  that  incoming  and outgoing  telecom  traffic should  be equal. First, international  trade
always involves  imbalances,  and telecom  traffic is no different  (Melody,  2000). Second,
residents  of wealthier  countries  are likely  to make more calls  to residents  of poorer countries
than vice-versa  if prices  are symmetric. Finally,  and perhaps  most importantly,  different  levels
of competition  and market structure  around  the world and arbitrary  accounting  rates  between
countries  have  led to serious  distortions  in the international  telecommunications  market.
l  The accounting  rate system  began  in the 1930s  when  all countries  had monopoly  telecom  providers.  A system
was needed  to facilitate  interconnection  between  these  carriers  to make  international  telephony  possible. See Ergas
and Paterson  (1991)  or Frieden  (1996)  for a detailed  history  of the accounting  rate  system.
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"callback." 3 The liberalized  and relatively  competitive  US market  means that retail  prices of
calls from the US to other countries  are typically  much lower  than  prices of calls  to the US.
Technological  advances  make it trivial to reverse  a call terminating  in the US and make it appear
to originate  in the US (or any other  country). Consumers  abroad  have probably  benefited  from
callback,  which effectively  brings  the price of calls  to the US closer  to the prices of calls from
the US.4
All these factors  stimulating  calls from the US (both  those that truly originate  in the US
and those  that cause calls to appear to have originated  in the US) have generated  a large gap
between  incoming  and outgoing  US telephone  traffic. As Figure 1 demonstrates,  traffic from the
US to the rest of the world soared  while  traffic to the US increased  only slightly  during  the
1990s. As a result, net settlement  payments  from the US to these countries  increased  from about
$1 billion in 1985  to more  than $5 billion  in 1996  before falling  to about $4.4 billion  in 1998  as
accounting  rates began  to fall (see Figure 2). Needless  to say, US international  telecom carriers
were increasingly  upset  by the large  payments  they were making  to foreign  telecom firms. And,
indeed,  the FCC (1997)  estimated  that "at least seventy  percent of that total [is] an above-cost
subsidy  from US consumers  to foreign  carriers."
2  Consumers,  however,  would  have  great cause  to complain.  Balanced  traffic  would  simply  allow all telecom  firms
to benefit  equally  from accounting  rates  that keep  prices far above  cost.
3  Call rerouting-diverting traffic  through  a third  country-is  also common  and has the same  effect as callback.
4  Many  believe  that callback  benefits  liberalized  countries  by pushing  down prices. Malueg  and Schwartz  (1998),
however,  demonstrate  how the symmetric  division  of accounting  rates and "proportional  return"-a  feature  of the
accounting  rate  system  mandating  that traffic  from foreign  monopolists  go to US carriers  in  proportion  to those
carriers  share  of traffic  to the foreign  country-can actually  benefit  the monopolists.
Page 5Incoming traffic highly profitable
One reason US interexchange carriers find the imbalance upsetting is because incoming
traffic under the accounting rate regime tends to be much more profitable to them than is
outgoing traffic.  Consider a telecom firm's profits for outgoing and incoming calls, where n is
the firm's profit, Q is telecom traffic, S is the settlement rate, MC is the true marginal cost of the
call (assumed to be equal for originating or terminating a call), and P is the price charged to the
consumer:
Incoming:  xi =  *[S-MC]
Outgoing:  'O = QJ*P  - Qo  *[S + MC]
An incoming minute is more valuable to the firm than an outgoing minute if
S-MC>  P-[S+  MC]
S>  /21P
As long as the settlement rate is more than half the price charged the consumer, the firm's profits
from incoming calls are greater than from outgoing calls.
As Cave and Waverman (1998, p.884) note, "each operator will have a desired optimal
accounting rate.  In determining this rate, the operator-if  unconstrained by regulation-will
strike a balance between the profits available to it from terminating a call (causing it to favor a
high rate) and the desire to earn profits on outgoing calls (causing it to prefer a lower settlement
rate paid to its correspondent)."  The current system also means that firms with net inflows prefer
higher accounting rates, since S - MC represents profit, while countries with net outflows prefer
low accounting rates, since S is a cost they must cover (Ergas and Paterson, 1991).
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Since US international carriers are unlikely in the foreseeable future to have more
incoming than outgoing traffic, it is not surprising that they would like settlement rates to
decrease.  As settlement rates come down, outgoing calls become more profitable.  Likewise,
foreign carriers, which even absent callback are likely to receive more calls from the US than
vice-versa, oppose reducing settlement rates.  And while callback has undoubtedly put
downward pressure on retail prices of calls to the US, by itself it is unlikely to push down
accounting rates.  Because incoming calls are so profitable, non-US monopolists can still earn
above-normal profits from callback even if incoming calls substitute for outgoing calls. 5
Along with settlement payments, Figure 2 shows average US accounting rates by region
from 1985 to 1999.  The figure reveals an unmistakable downward trend in accounting rates to
all points in the world.  This trend probably resulted from the FCC's  1986 decision to allow the
resale of international private leased circuits for international telecommunications (Stern and
Kelly, 1997). The FCC hoped that the use of private circuits would introduce competition into
the international telecommunications market, putting downward pressure on prices.
Nonetheless, US outgoing traffic increased faster than settlement rates decreased, and net
settlement payments continued to skyrocket.
In 1992, the ITU attempted to reduce accounting rates with agreement ITU-T D. 140,
"which committed them to implementing principles of cost-orientation, non-discrimination, and
transparency when negotiating accounting rates, and to do so within a five-year period" (Kelly,
1997). This initiative had moderate success at best.  Indeed, by 1996 rates remained far above
5  Some carriers have taken this arbitrage a step further. In 1997 Hong Kong Telecommunications Intemational
launched  its own callback  service,  which  presumably  allowed  it to receive  a settlement  payment  for incoming  calls it
generated  and also  reap additional  profits  as long as it could  price the callback  service  above  the settlement  rate.
Page  7cost, and the rate of decrease even seemed to slow (for example, the average accounting rate for
traffic between the US and Africa barely budged between 1991 and 1995). Moreover, rates are
anything but transparent-only  the US, the U.K., and New Zealand make their accounting rates
public (Kelly, 1997; Wheatley, 1999).
Under pressure from US international carriers and anxious to reduce prices of
international calls, the FCC decided to act unilaterally.  In August 1997 the FCC adopted an
order specifying benchmark rates and a strict timeline for their adoption.  Table 1 shows the
benchmark rates, whose level and adoption timeline depend on national income and teledensity
(telephones per capita). High-income countries (those with a per-capita income of about $9000
and higher) had to reduce settlement rates to $0.15 per minute almost immediately.  Low-income
countries (those with annual per-capita incomes of less than about $730) with less than one
mainline per hundred people had until 2003 to adopt settlement rates of $0.23 per minute.
High-income countries with liberalized telecom markets had no trouble meeting this goal.
For example, by 1999 the off-peak accounting rate between the US and the U.K. was about $0.14
per minute (meaning the settlement rate was about $0.07 per minute)-well  below the
benchmark.  Indeed, in 1999 the FCC decided that the accounting rate system is entirely
unnecessary for countries with competitive telecom markets.  FCC Order 99-73 "removed the
international settlements policy and contract filing requirements for arrangements with foreign
carriers that lack market power [and] removed the international settlements policy for
arrangements with all carriers on routes where rates to terminate US calls are at least 25 percent
lower than the relevant settlement rate benchmark previously adopted by the FCC in its
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from the accounting  rate  regime (FCC 1999b).'
Meeting  the benchmarks  is not easy for developing  countries. While  they were allowed
settlement  rates more  than 50 percent higher  than  high-income  countries,  their rates  had much
further  to fall. In 1996  the average  settlement  rate for African  and South  Asian countries,  for
example,  was almost $1.00 and $1.40 per minute,  respectively. By 1999  those rates had fallen  to
about  $0.60 and $1.20 per minute. These reductions  have affected  net settlement  payments,
which  began  to decline  in 1997. While  dramatic,  the rates are still far from the FCC
benchmarks.
Developing  countries  have  objected  strongly  to the FCC's order. This is hardly
surprising  given  the direction  of the payments  and the fact  that the payments  can represent  more
than half of all reported  telecom  revenue  in some developing  countries  (Braga,  et al, 1998).?  But
the important  question  is what the real effects of reduced settlement  rates are likely  to be.
Madden  and Savage  (1998)  demonstrate  that accounting  rates, along with market structure  and
ownership,  are an important  determinant  of retail prices. Thus, lower settlement  rates, by
reducing  the costs to the carrier  of an international  call, should  reduce  retail  prices. Ergas and
Paterson  (1991)  note  that international  telecom  traffic is quite  price sensitive. Lower  prices, by
stimulating  additional  telecom  traffic, would  benefit  the economies  of developing  countries.
Lower settlement  rates also mean lower settlement  payments,  which  developing  countries  view
6  These countries are Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
7  Interestingly, while US interexchange (long distance) carriers such as AT&T and WorldCom supported the FCC's
decision to lower accounting rates, other US telecom finns, such as SBC and GTE, opposed it (Telecommunication
Reports, 1997). This opposition is undoubtedly because those firns  are large stakeholders in foreign carriers
including Telmex (Mexico, partly owned by SBC) and CANTV (Venezuela, partly owned by GTE), which receive
large net settlement payments.  In 1997, Mexico and Venezuela received $710 million and $72 million, respectively,
in net settlement payments. Because of their ownership positions in foreign telecom firms, many US telecom frmns
also benefit from net settlement payments.  In other words, some of the settlement payments are simply transfers
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countries maintain that these transfers help finance the development of their local networks.
Whether that is true is an empirical question.
In the remainder of the paper I set out to uncover the real effects of international
settlement rates. Specifically, I ask two questions.  First, how do settlement rates affect telecom
traffic?  Second, how do settlement payments affect investment in the local telecom network?
The following sections discuss the data, methodology, and results.
Empirical Methods and Results
Data
The data I use to investigate these questions come from several sources. The FCC
publishes historical accounting rates between the US and all other countries. 8 These data are
currently available from 1985 through 1999. To make the rates comparable across countries and
over time, I calculate the rate for a three-minute call between the US and each other country.  In
a few countries with multiple carriers the rate differs by carrier.  In those cases I take the average
rate for that country. International traffic data also comes from the FCC.  Each year the FCC
publishes what is known as the "43.61 International Traffic Report" which provides, among
other information, total minutes of incoming and outgoing traffic between the US and every
other country. Traffic data are currently available from 1992 through 1998.9 Finally, net
settlement payments also come from the FCC, and are available from 1985-1998.1o Figures 1
through 3, discussed above, show regional trends in these data.
from one  US-based  carrier  to another.
s Available  from < http://www.fcc.gov/ib/td/pf/account.html>
9  Available  from < http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Commnon_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Linkl/intl.html>.
0  Available  from <http://www.fcc.gov/ib/td/pf/account.html>
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telecommunications sector in countries around the world.  The ITU data I use include telecom
revenues, the number of telephone mainlines, and imports of telecommunications equipment (in
dollars) by country for 1985-1998. Finally, World Bank Development Indicators provide each
country's population and GDP.
Accounting rates and call volume
Perhaps the most serious problem with the accounting rate system is that it has kept
telephone rates for international calls far above cost by essentially putting a floor on the rate any
firm can charge.  Madden and Savage (1998) demonstrate that accounting rates are an important
determinant in retail prices.  Ergas and Paterson (1991) report a strong price elasticity of
international calls, with greater elasticities for higher accounting rates.  These relationships
suggest that lower accounting rates are likely to stimulate additional telecom traffic.
To test the relationship between accounting rates and call volume, I estimate equation (1):
(1)  Ma,  = f3i(R,,*Low,d  + / 2(Ru  *LowMid,d  +  , 3(Rj,*UpMid,d  + fl4(R 1 ,*HighdJ  + ri(Low,d  +
r(LowMid,)  +  r 3(UpMiddJ  + n 4(Highi)  + a,(populationid  + a2(income,d  + S,(Year)  +
8j2(Country)  + sit
In this equation, Mid  is the number of minutes from country i in year t to the US that are billed in
country i.  Ri, is the settlement rate between country i and the US in year t.  Lowi, LowMidi,,
UpMidj,k  and Highit are dummy variables indicating whether the country is considered low,
lower-middle, upper-middle, or high income, respectively.  I include population and income to
control for the two factors that are likely to be the most important determinant of international
telecom traffic.  I include year fixed effects to control for time trends, and country fixed effects
Page 1  1to control for unobserved country differences. All variables are included as logs of the actual
value, so the equation is a log-linear specification.
I interact the settlement rate with the income level dummy variables to test how the
effects of accounting rate changes affect countries depending on their development status.
Specifying the model this way is important for several reasons.  First, the FCC order sets the
benchmark settlement rate according to this division. It is therefore necessary to determine how
accounting rate changes are likely to affect countries within these groupings. Second,
accounting rates tend to be much higher for poorer countries, meaning both that they have further
to fall to meet the benchmarks and that changes may have bigger effects.  Finally, poorer
countries are upset by the decision and will see the biggest changes; we must determine how they
will be affected.
The careful reader will note that Mi, is the number of minutes of telecom traffic to the US
billed outside of the US rather than total telecom traffic.  I purposely exclude the number of
minutes billed inside the US.  The reason for this decision is that callback and other innovations
have caused much of incoming US traffic to appear in the data as outgoing US traffic (and thus
billed in the US).  Because outgoing minutes surged as accounting rates fell, any empirical
analysis that did not control for callback volume would likely find a negative correlation between
traffic and accounting rates.  Without that crucial control, however, the finding would be
specious. Unfortunately, there is no good estimate of callback volume between the US and each
other country.
Using minutes billed abroad nicely solves this problem for the purposes of the analysis.
Callback and other technologies have suppressed the number of minutes billed outside the US, as
some traffic that actually originates outside the US is recorded as if it had originated inside the
Page 12US.  By using this figure I bias the estimation against finding a negative correlation between
settlement rates and call volumes since rates fell while incoming minutes were artificially
suppressed. In other words, this analysis will understate any stimulatory effect that reduced
accounting rates may have on outgoing telecom traffic.
Table 2 shows the results of this estimation.  The first column shows the results when
country and year fixed effects are included.  The estimation reveals a strong, statistically
significant, negative price elasticity for all income levels.  Even more striking is the fact that the
elasticity (and statistical significance) appears stronger for poorer countries. The poorest
countries show an elasticity of negative 0.9: for each one percent decrease in the settlement rate
outgoing traffic increases by about 0.9 percent.
It seems surprising at first that population and income are not significant in determining
outgoing call volume.  The main reason for this result appears to be the inclusion of the country
fixed effects. These fixed effects control for much of the variation in population and income, as
the second column of the table, which shows the estimation without the country fixed effects,
reveals. This estimation shows that the negative price elasticity remains, and also that population
and income are correlated with outgoing minutes.  While excluding the fixed effects is useful to
demonstrate more simple correlations, they are important to include since the estimation cannot
otherwise control for so many other unobserved country-specific factors.
The empirical results strongly suggest that, as we would expect, reducing accounting
rates will stimulate international telephone traffic.  Moreover, this effect is stronger for poorer
countries.  In this respect, not only will poor countries benefit from reductions in accounting
rates, but they will benefit by even more than rich countries. Consider, for example, Africa.  In
1998 the average settlement rate was about $0.72 per minute.  Telecom traffic from Africa to the
Page 13US that year  totaled  about 98 million  minutes. Reducing  the accounting  rate to $0.23  per minute
implies approximately  a 70 percent decrease  in the settlement  rate. Assuming  that most African
countries  fall in the "low income"  category,  our estimated  price elasticity  suggests  the rate
decrease  would  mean a 63 percent  increase  in minutes. While  it is dangerous  to project  out-of-
sample,  the estimates  suggest  that traffic to the US could increase  by almost 59 million  minutes
as a result of the rate decrease  alone.
Settlement  payments  and investment  in telephone  networks
Few  would  argue with the conclusion  that  reduced settlement  rates  will stimulate
telephone  traffic. Instead,  the controversy  focuses  on the settlement  payments. Essentially,
developing  countries  contend  that those payments  help  finance  investments  in their domestic
networks. In this section  I evaluate  that claim. I estimate  three versions  of equation  (2) to
explore  the relationship  between  investment  and settlement  payments.
(2)  Y,,  = A3(Pay.i*Lowid  + f2(Payi,*LowMid,d  + /3 3(Paym,*UpMid,9  + 134(Pay,*High,d  + y,(Low,d  +
Y2(LowMid,d  + y3(UpMid,d  + WfHighid  + ao(population,d  + a2(income,d  + t(Year)  +
82(Country)  + s,1
Payi, is the net settlement  payment  from  the US to country  i in year t.  The other independent
variables  are as defined  above. Y;,  represents  a different  variable  for each of the three versions of
the equation. First, I run the regression  defining Yit  as telecom  revenues. Second,  I define  the
dependent  variable  as the number  of mainlines  in the country. Number  of mainlines  is probably
the best indicator  of true investment  as it indicates  national  penetration  of the telecom  network.
Finally,  I define  the variable  as spending  on imports  of telecommunications  equipment. While
this may not be a good indicator  of investment  for industrialized  countries,  it is quite good for
Page 14developing  countries,  which  import  almost  all such  equipment  and claim  to need the hard
currency  from the settlement  payments  in order  to pay for those imports.
The first  column  of Table  3 shows  the relationship  between  telecom  revenue and
settlement  payments. With  the exception  of upper-middle  income  countries,  we observe  a
statistically  significant  positive  correlation  between  settlement  payments  and telecom  revenues.
In this light,  it is clear why  telecom  firms  in developing  countries  are upset  by the FCC decision:
reduced  settlement  payments  will reduce  their revenues. The question  is, what happens  to this
additional  telecom  revenue? Is it invested  in the domestic  telecom  network? Will reduced
settlement  payments  reduce  investments  in domestic  networks?
The second  column  of Table  3, which  shows  the results  of estimating  equation  (2) when
the dependent  variable  is the log of the number  of mainlines,  begins  to suggest  the answer. The
estimation  reveals  no correlation  between  settlement  payments  and network  growth  (except  in
the wealthiest  countries). Indeed,  for the poorest countries  the estimation  reveals a t-statistic  of
only 0.17  on the payment  coefficient. We cannot  reject  the hypothesis  that settlement  payments
have  no effect on network  growth. In other words,  the data do not support  the contention  that
settlement  payments  have  been invested  in the domestic  network.
To investigate  further,  I explore  the effects  of settlement  payments  on imports  of
telecommunications  equipment. The third column  shows  the result of estimating  Equation  (2)
using  imports  of telecom  equipment  as the dependent  variable. Again,  there is no statistically
significant  correlation  between  payments  and imports  (moreover,  the sign on the coefficient,
though  statistically  insignificant,  is negative). Similar  to the estimation  just described,  the
evidence  suggests  that settlement  payments  are not used for imports  of telecommunications
equipment.
Page 15In sum, the data confirm that settlement payments are an important component of telecom
revenues in poor countries.  However, claims to the contrary notwithstanding, the data strongly
suggest that settlement payments are not invested in dormestic  telecom networks.  This result
suggests that investment in telecom networks in developing countries is unlikely to be greatly
affected by the FCC's  decision to reduce settlement rates.
Discussion
The finding that accounting rates are negatively correlated with telecom traffic is neither
surprising nor controversial. We already have evidence that accounting rates are an important
determinant of international telecom prices, and that international traffic is sensitive to price.
The finding in this paper regarding elasticities follows directly from, and is entirely consistent
with, the existing literature.
The finding that settlement payments do not appear to fund telecom investments in poor
countries may be more surprising at first, and is certainly more controversial.  Upon reflection,
however, any result other than the one found here should be surprising.  First, there is no
particular reason why additional revenues would go for telecom investments as opposed to
anything else.  As Wettemann and Kelly (1998) note, "hard currency settlement payments can be
used to purchase foreign telecommunications equipment, repay infrastructure loans, or (in some
cases) fulfill other national fiscal demands outside the telecommunications sector."  In other
words, money is fungible and payments may not necessarily be funneled into investment.
If the firm is a rational profit maximizer then it will undertake investments if the expected
returns exceed the cost of capital.  If the firm faces no or low capital constraints then an extra
infusion of cash is unlikely to stimulate additional investment.  Low, if any, capital constraints,
Page 16are not unlikely for many countries.  Consider the case of Mexico.  Telmex is largely
privatized-by  1998 it was 55.1 percent privately-held.  Almost 25 percent is publicly-held and
20.4 percent owned by a consortium that includes France Telecom and SBC (SBC has also
bought an additional 5.1 percent on its own) (ITU, 1998). Mexico, meanwhile, received almost
$655 million in settlement payments in 1998, about 14 percent of the total.  While the payments
certainly increase profits, it is difficult to imagine that this multinational consortium faced credit
constraints and that the settlement payments would cause it to alter its investment strategy.
While many private telecom firms-especially  those that allow foreign ownership-are
unlikely to face severe capital constraints, the poorest countries that retain state-owned providers
may.  Even then, however, it is unrealistic to expect settlement payments to necessarily be used
for telecom investments as opposed to other priorities.  State-owned firms may have many,
perhaps contradictory, objectives (e.g., profit maximization and employment maximization) and
constraints.  Even if the settlement payment stays in the telecom sector, there may be no
incentive to use it for investment as opposed to any other objective.  Indeed, unconditional
foreign assistance (which are essentially equivalent to settlement payments) can prevent reforms
by subsidizing inefficient operations (World Bank, 1995).
The point of this discussion is not that reduced settlement payments would have no
consequences for developing countries.  Indeed, a sharp reduction in capital inflows-especially
if the amount is large relative to the economy-could  create real difficulties.  The point,
however, is that it is not realistic to expect these transfers to be used exclusively for telecom
investment.
Page 17Conclusion
The international accounting rate system currently helps keep the prices of international
telephone traffic significantly above cost.  While rates had been falling for the previous decade,
settlement payments from the US to other countries had been soaring.  In 1997, largely in
response to pressure from US carriers who felt they were subsidizing foreign telecom firns, the
US FCC unilaterally decided to establish benchmark rates much closer to the true cost of service.
The FCC's decision has been extremely controversial. In this paper I take an empirical look at
two important aspects of settlement rates: their effect on international telecom traffic, and their
effect on telecom investment in developing countries.
I find that telecom traffic is sensitive to settlement rates.  Reduced settlement rates lead to
increased telecom traffic, and the biggest price effects occur in the poorest countries.  That is, the
poorest countries are likely to see the largest increase in telecom traffic as a result of decreases in
the settlement rate.  I also find no evidence that settlement payments are used to fund telecom
investment.  Settlement payments, while significantly correlated with telecom revenues, have no
effect on mainline growth or imports of telecommunications equipment.  In short, the data
suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, settlement payments have not been invested in
domestic telecom networks in developing countries.
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Telecom Traffic  To and From the United States
Africa  South  Asia
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FCC  Benchmarks
Country income level  Target rate Target date
per minute
High (>= $8,956)  $0.15  1999
Upper-middle ($2,896-$8,955)  $0.19  2000
Lower-middle  ($726-$2,895)  $0.19  2001
Low (<$726)  $0.23  2002
Teledensity < 1  $0.23  2003
Page 23Table 2
Effect  of Settlement  Rates  on Call Volume
(absolute  t-statistics  in parentheses)
Dependent  variable:  In(minutes  billed  abroad)
Mean of dependent  variable:  14.95
With country  Without
country  fixed fixed  effects  ffes
effects
ln(Rate - Low)  -U.89  -1.4U
(3.39)  (9.64)
ln(Rate  * LowMid)  -0.37  -2.54
(2.46)  (10.69)
ln(Rate * UpMid)  -0.58  -2.65
(2.87)  (7.08)
In(Rate * High)  -0.17  -0.87
(1.85)  (5.86)
ln(population)  0.56  0.71
(0.38)  (35.76)
In(gdp per capita)  -0.14  1.11
(0.40)  (11.64)
Low income  0.94  3.11
(2.73)  (17.68)
Low-Middle Income  0.62  4.09
(3.35)  (18.41)
Upper-Middle Incom  0.58  3.59
(2.54)  (10.73)
High Income  0.41  1.68
(1.61)  (4.51)
R-squared  0.98  0.82
Number observations  883  883
Year fixed effects included in both estimations, but
not shown.
Page  24Table  3
Effect  of Settlement  Payments  on Telecom  Provision
(absolute t-statistics in parentheses)
telecom  1imports  or
Dependent variable: log of  revenue  mainlines  telecom
equipment
Mean of dependent variable  19.59  12.35  18.92
In(Payment * Low)  0.04  0.002  -0.03
(1.87)  (0.17)  (0.50j
ln(Payment * LowMid)  0.08  0.01  -0.04
(3.31)  (0.82)  (0.70)
In(Payment * UpMid)  0.02  -0.002  0.02
(0.85)  (0.14)  (0.26)
In(Payment * High)  0.05  0.02  -0.07
(2.11)  (1.96)  (1.34)
ln(population)  -0.08  1.16  -0.24
(0.29)  (9.53)  (0.52)
ln(gdp per capita)  1.04  0.702  1.77
(7.21)  (9.98)  (6.51)
Low income  -0.74  -0.2  0.8
(1.56)  (1.35)  (0.64)
Low-Middle  Income  -1.23  -0.21  0.93
(2.65)  (1.21)  (0.97)
Upper-Middle Incom  -0.32  0.09  -0.06
(0.67)  (0.47)  (0.06)
High Income  -0.81  -0.42  1.49
(1.82)  (1.97)  (1.50)
R-squared  0.99  0.99  0.97
Number observations  1564  1760  826
Country and year fixed effects included, but results not shown.
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